Entrepreneurship as institutional design
I ask how institutions allocate risk, recoverability, and opportunity across entrepreneurs, firms, workers, and communities.
I study how legal, political, and organizational institutions shape entrepreneurship, innovation, and strategic action. My work connects entrepreneurial ecosystems, governance, antitrust, and the institutional design of markets.
I ask how institutions allocate risk, recoverability, and opportunity across entrepreneurs, firms, workers, and communities.
My courses emphasize rigorous case analysis, clear strategic judgment, and the discipline to test popular management ideas against research.
My legal training lets me treat markets, firms, and entrepreneurial ecosystems as governed systems rather than neutral backdrops.
The headline is not “entrepreneurship professor with a law degree.” It is a scholar of how institutions make entrepreneurial action more or less possible, with legal training used as a theory-building asset rather than a biographical aside.
How do institutions determine whether entrepreneurship becomes a mechanism of opportunity, innovation, and democratic resilience—or a mechanism for shifting risk onto individuals least able to absorb it?
Entrepreneurial ecosystems are not merely resource pools. They are local institutional arrangements that determine whether founders can recover from setback, re-enter markets, and remain economically viable after failure.
This stream develops a governance theory of entrepreneurial resource mobilization, explaining how ventures reduce diligence, monitoring, and contracting frictions when cooperation becomes credibly self-enforcing.
This work examines how law structures market entry, innovation incentives, and the boundaries of strategic behavior.
This project examines how democratic institutions influence the composition of entrepreneurship and whether opportunity-driven entrepreneurship depends on institutional resilience.